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 In a scathing opinion, the United States District Court for the District of 
Wyoming granted a motion for preliminary injunction, effectively blocking the 
BLM’s new Fracking Rule from being implemented on federal and tribal lands in 
the United States. The court held not only was the BLM’s new rule likely 
arbitrary and capricious, but the department lacked the authority to regulate 
fracking. The opinion relied on the Safe Drinking Water Act and the Energy 
Policy Act to determine that Congress explicitly removed fracking from federal 
regulation. Pending an appeal, the new Fracking Rule will not be implemented.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
At issue in Wyoming v. United States Department of Interior was the 
validity of the Bureau of Land Management’s (“BLM”) final regulations 
concerning Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Land (“Fracking Rule”),1 
which applies to hydraulic fracturing on federal and Indian lands.2 Petitioners 
from various western states, tribes, and industries filed for a preliminary 
injunction of the rule, contending that it “should be set aside because it is 
arbitrary, not in accordance with the law, and in excess of the BLM’s statutory 
jurisdiction and authority,” as well as contrary to the federal trust obligation to 
tribes.3 The court held in favor of the petitioners on all arguments.4 The court 
found that regulating the process of fracking was outside the BLM’s 
congressionally delegated authority.5 The court also found that the Fracking Rule 
was likely arbitrary and violated the federal trust doctrine.6  Additionally, the 
court held that petitioners would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction.7 
Lastly, the court held that the balance of equities, including the public interest, 
tipped in favor of the petitioners. 8  Thus, the court granted a preliminary 
injunction against the BLM’s Fracking Rule.9 
 
 
                                                     
1  Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 80 Fed. Reg. 
16,128 (Mar. 26, 2015). 
2  Wyoming v. U.S. DOI, No. 2:15-CV-043-SWS, ___ F. Supp. 3d___, 2015 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 135044 (D. Wyo. Sept. 30, 2015). 
3  Id. at *11.  
4  Id. 
5  Id. at *16. 
6  Id. at *59-60. 
7  Id. at *69. 
8  Id. at *75. 
9  Id. at *82. 
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II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 Over the last decade, domestic oil and gas production has increased 
through the technique of fracking. 10  In response to this increase and public 
concern about fracking’s effect on ground water sources, the BLM undertook 
rulemaking to increase regulations and oversight of fracking. 11  The initial 
proposed rule set out three goals: (1) to disclose the chemicals used in hydraulic 
fracturing; (2) to strengthen well-bore integrity regulations; and (3) to address 
concerns regarding water produced during oil and gas operations.12 The initial 
proposed rule received 177,000 public comments.13 The BLM issued a revised 
proposal just over a year later, which expanded the set of cement evaluation tools, 
revised the reporting process for chemicals, and expressed an intent to work with 
states and tribes. 14  This revised proposed rule received over 1.35 million 
comments.15 The final rule was published on March 26, 2015.16 The industry 
petitioners, Wyoming, and Colorado each filed separate Petitions for Review of 
Final Agency Action pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) in 
March.17 The Ute Indian Tribe, North Dakota, and Utah joined the petitioners, 
and the court granted a motion to consolidate.18 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
A.  Likelihood of Success on the Merits 
 
The court used the standards set forth in Section 706 of the APA to 
conduct a “thorough, probing, in-depth review.”19 The court set out to determine 
whether the BLM acted within the scope of its authority, complied with 
prescribed procedures, and whether its actions was otherwise arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion.20 
 
1.  BLM’s Authority 
 
The court found that the BLM did not have the authority to regulate 
fracking. 21  The BLM claimed authority under the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act (“FLPMA”), the Mineral Leasing Act (“MLA”), among 
                                                     
10  Id. at *6. 
11  Id. at *7. 
12  Id. at *8 (quoting 80 Fed. Reg. at 16,131). 
13  Id. at *8. 
14  Id. 
15  Id. at *9. 
16  Id.  
17  Id. 
18  Id. at *9-10. 
19  Id. at *12 (quoting Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 42 F.3d 1560, 1574 
(10th Cir. 1994)). 
20  Id. 
21  Id. at *16. 
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others.22 The court addressed each act individually and held that none of them 
gave the BLM authority to regulate fracking.23 The court first held that the MLA 
only gives rulemaking authority to BLM to carry out the purpose of the act, 
which is to regulate surface-disturbing activities.24 The court then held that while 
the Right-of-Way Leasing Act and the Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands 
expanded the authority of the MLA, they only did so with regards to location, 
and did not authorize the BLM to regulate non-surface-disturbing activities.25 
The court next held that the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of 
1982 simply created a system for collecting and accounting for royalties and 
were not applicable to the Fracking Rule either.26 
The court next addressed the BLM’s claim that the Indian Mineral 
Leasing Act and the Indian Mineral Development Act granted the authority for 
the Fracking Rule.27 The court held neither act delegated more authority than the 
MLA.28 The court then addressed the BLM’s claim that the rule was simply a 
supplement to existing regulations set out in Onshore Oil and Gas Orders 1, 2, 
and 7.29 The BLM claimed that these “cradle-to-grave” regulations, promulgated 
pursuant to authority from the MLA, already include the regulation of fracking.30 
Because of this, the BLM argued that the Fracking Rule simply expanded current 
regulations as the demand for fracking increased.31 The court again rejected the 
BLM’s claim of authority and held that the BLM’s only previous regulations of 
fracking were to prevent further surface disturbance and to establish reporting 
requirements, but were not regulations of the fracking process itself.32 Lastly, the 
court addressed the BLM’s claim of authority under the FLPMA.33 The court’s 
analysis focused on the multiple-use balancing act of the FLPMA and the broad 
authority granted to the BLM as it pertained to land-use planning.34 Because of 
this focus, the court held that the FLPMA was primarily a planning statute and 
did not grant the BLM regulatory authority beyond the issuance of permits.35 
After the court rejected the BLM’s list of authorities, the court pointed to 
the Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”) to show that Congress had invested the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) with the authority to regulate 
fracking.36 Although the EPA had initially taken the position that fracking was 
not subject to the SDWA, the court relied on an opinion from the United States 
                                                     
22  Id. at *16-17. 
23  Id. at *17-26. 
24  Id. at *17. 
25  Id. at *18-19. 
26  Id. at *19. 
27  Id. at *19-20. 
28  Id. at *20. 
29  Id. (citing 80 Fed. Reg. at 16,129). 
30  Id. at *20. 
31  Id. 
32  Id. at *21. 
33  Id. at *22-25. 
34  Id. at *24-25. 
35  Id. 
36  Id. at *26-27. 
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Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which held that Congress had intended 
fracking to fall under the statutory definition of “underground injection.”37 The 
court then analyzed this authority under the Energy Policy Act of 2005 
(“EPAct”). 38  Under the EPAct, Congress expressly revised the definition of 
“underground injection” to exclude fracking, except where diesel fuels are 
used. 39  In doing so, the court held that Congress completely removed the 
regulation of non-diesel fuel fracking from federal authority.40 The BLM argued 
that because the SDWA and the EPAct did not prohibit any regulation by the 
BLM, they should not be applied because a regulatory gap would result.41 The 
court rejected the argument, refusing to “presume a delegation of power simply 
from the absence of a withholding of power.”42 The court held that a regulatory 
gap was not enough evidence and that power must come from a valid grant of 
authority from Congress.43 Lastly, the court dismissed any deference argument 
by holding that “Chevron [sic] ‘is not a wand by which courts can turn an 
unlawful frog into a legitimate prince.’” 44  The court conducted no further 
analysis regarding agency deference. 
 
2.  APA Standards 
 
The court additionally ruled that even if the BLM had the authority to 
regulate fracking, the rule was arbitrary and should be set aside.45 This holding 
was based on the BLM’s failure, in the eyes of the court, to establish a problem 
the rule is meant to address or identify a gap in existing regulations that the rule 
would fill. 46  The court rejected the BLM’s concerns about groundwater 
contamination, stating that the BLM failed to reference a confirmed case of 
contaminated groundwater and found that their concerns warranted further study 
but not comprehensive rulemaking.47 Additionally, the court rejected the BLM’s 
argument that the rule is needed due to the lack of uniformity in state 
regulations.48 The court held that a desire for uniformity is insufficient because 
the BLM failed to show that any of the regulations are inadequate.49 While the 
                                                     
37  Id. at *27-28 (referencing Legal Envtl. Ass’n Found., Inc. v. EPA, 118 F.3d 
1467 (11th Cir. 1997)). 
38  Id. at *28 (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 300h-1(b), (c), (e) (2012)). 
39  Id. at *29 (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2012)). 
40  Id. at *29-34. 
41  Id. at *31-32. 
42  Id. at *32 (quoting Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152, 160 
(4th Cir. 2013)). 
43   Id. at *33-34 (quoting Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000)).  
44  Id. at *34 (quoting Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981, 1001 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987)). 
45  Id. at *42.  
46  Id. at *34-35. 
47  Id. at *34, 40. 
48  Id. at *40-41. 
49  Id. at *41. 
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court did not go into every detail of why the rule was arbitrary, it focused on 
mechanical integrity testing, the “usable water” definition, and pre-operation 
disclosures as arbitrary.50 
 
3.  Consultation with Indian Tribes 
 
In its last step analyzing the merits of the case, the court held that the 
BLM failed to properly consult with Indian tribes in accordance with Order No. 
3317 issued by the Secretary of the Interior to guide consultation.51 The court 
held that BLM’s consultation process with tribes, which included comments and 
meetings, was little more than what the BLM offered to the general public and 
overall insufficient to meet the BLM’s own consultation standards. 52  This 
supported the conclusion that the BLM’s actions were arbitrary and capricious.53 
 
B.  Irreparable Harm 
 
 The court held that the state, tribal, and industry petitioners all 
demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary 
injunction.54 The court determined the harm to be the infringement of sovereign 
authority, and economic losses in the form of substantially decreased royalty and 
tax revenue for the petitioner states and tribes.55 These harms were sufficient due 
to the inability to recover any money lost from the immune federal sovereign.56 
The  court found that the industry petitioners would suffer irreparable harm in the 
form of compliance costs. 57  The compliance costs met the standards of 
irreparable harm due to plans of some petitioners to complete wells using 
fracking in the coming months.58 The BLM argued that these costs would only be 
incurred due to the voluntary action of drilling, but the court held this argument 
invalid due to the BLM’s failure to consider other costs in planning and 
drilling.59  
Additionally, the court relied on the potential disclosure of trade secrets 
under the new Fracking Rule’s requirements to hold that the industry petitioners 
would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction.60 This holding relied heavily 
on the BLM’s own admission that some of the information would be subject to 
Freedom of Information Act requests outside of the Fracking Rule’s authority.61 
                                                     
50  Id. at *42-54. 
51  Id. at *54. 
52  Id. at *59. 
53  Id. at *60. 
54  Id. at *69. 
55  Id. at *61-62. 
56  Id. at *63. 
57  Id. at *64-69. 
58  Id. at *67. 
59  Id.  
60  Id. at *69. 
61  Id.  
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C.  Balance of Equities and Public Interest 
 
 The last step in analyzing a motion for preliminary injunction a 
balancing of the equities, and when the government is a party, the court may take 
the public interest into account as well.62 The court held the public interest here 
to be a toss-up between the interest in safe and environmentally responsible 
development and larger proceeds from development.63 The court then balanced 
the interests of the BLM and the petitioners. The BLM’s interests were held to be 
limited to inconvenience. The court further analyzed BLM’s failure to adequately 
prove that the rule protects against any environmental harm.64 Because the court 
already held that the Fracking Rule was likely without authority, arbitrary, and 
unlikely to prevent any environmental harm, the interests of the industry 
regarding reduced compliance costs was held to outweigh the BLM’s sole 
interest of inconvenience.65 Additionally, because the court held that there is no 
possible environmental harm, the public interest was best served by an injunction 
as well.66 
  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The court made two major holdings that may have widespread effects on 
the regulation of federal and tribal lands in the western United States. First, 
limiting the BLM’s authority of oil and gas on federal and tribal lands to specific 
methods and processes explicitly set aside by Congress could have a long-term 
effect on the efficiency of land management and resource development. Under 
the court’s proposed model, the BLM will be required to ask Congress for 
authority with each new development in drilling practices and techniques. 
Additionally, the court held that with the exception of spills or other accidents, 
there is no negative environmental impact from fracking. This holding may 
develop in the future as more cases go to trial over water contamination. 
Furthermore, this case highlights the need for a cooperative regulatory structure 
between the BLM and the EPA in regards to water quality management as it 
relates to oil and gas development. This decision is on appeal and may have 
further implications in the regulation of fracking. 
                                                     
62  Id. at *70. 
63  Id.  
64  Id. at *70-71. 
65  Id. at *74-75. 
66  Id.  
